Lloyd Karmeier
From Judgepedia
Contents |
Lloyd A. Karmeier is a justice on the Illinois Supreme Court from the 5th district which includes Madison and St. Clair counties.
Justices of the Illinois Supreme Court are elected to serve ten-year terms in partisan elections; Karmeier serves as a Republican. His current term expires in 2014.
Karmeier was born January 12, 1940, in rural Washington County, where he attended a one-room grade school and graduated as valedictorian in 1958 from Okawville Community High School. He received his B.S. degree in 1962 and his J.D. degree in 1964, both from the University of Illinois.
Legal career
Justice Karmeier clerked for former Illinois Supreme Court Justice Byron O. House from 1964 to 1968, served as state’s attorney of Washington County from 1968 to 1972, and clerked for former U.S. District Court Judge James L. Foreman from 1972 to 1973. He was engaged in the general practice of law with the firm of Hohlt, House, DeMoss & Johnson from 1964 to 1986. He was resident Circuit Judge of Washington County from 1986 to 2004, when he was elected to the Illinois Supreme Court.
2004 election
Justice Karmeier was elected in 2004 to the 5th district which includes Madison and St. Clair counties, routinely on or at the top of the American Tort Reform Association's list of "Judicial Hellholes."[1] For 2007, Madison and St. Clair counties fell off the top of the list and are on "watchlist" status, a vast improvement from 2002-2004 when Madison County was rated the number one "Judicial Hellhole."[2]
The election itself became the most expensive State Supreme Court race in the country. Justice Karmeier believes he won the district because voters perceived him as the most qualified candidate, and that the perception of Madison County courts as financed by trial attorneys and the number of doctors leaving the area also played a role.[3]
Memberships and Associations
Justice Karmeier is a member of the Illinois Judges Association, the Washington County, St. Clair County, East St. Louis and Illinois State Bar Associations, and past member of the American Bar Association and the American Judicature Society. He served as a member of the Assembly of the Illinois State Bar Association from 1996 to 2002, and as chair of the Bench and Bar Section Council. He also served on the Illinois Supreme Court Committee on Pattern Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases, chairing the committee from 2003 to 2004. He is a member of the Southern Illinois American Inn of Court and served as President of the Executive Committee from 2003 to 2007.[4]
News and Articles
Request for Investigation
In February 2006, three organizations (Common Cause, Citizen Action Illinois and Business and Professional People for the Public Interest) called for the Illinois Judicial Inquiry Board to investigate if Justice Karmeier should have recused himself from cases involving State Farm Insurance and Philip Morris.[5] In this case, one of the lawyers for the public interest groups was President Carter's ambassador for civil rights to the United Nations.[6]
On the Issues
On Class Actions/Class Action Abuse
- Justice Karmeier concurred in the majority opinion, written by Justice Thomas R. Fitzgerald, which concluded amongst other things, that defendant Intel's representation that its Pentium 4 computer processer was the best and fastest on the market, in contrast to its prior model, the Pentium 3 processer, was not a statement subject to attack as fraudulent, or as a "deceptive business practice" under the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act. In so ruling the Court overturned the decision of the circuit judge where the case originated, in notorious Madison County, Illinois.
- Justice Karmeier concurred in the majority opinion, which held that Based on these other authorities, read in conjunction with Illinois law, we conclude that the FTC could, and did, specifically authorize all United States tobacco companies to utilize the words “low,” “lower,” “reduced” or like qualifying terms, such as “light,” so long as the descriptive terms are accompanied by a clear and conspicuous disclosure of the “tar” and nicotine content. Thus Philip Morris could not be liable for defrauding smokers by using these terms, even if the terms were not accurate. In so ruling the Court overturned a contrasting $10.1 billion jury award out of notorious Madison County, Illinois. Justice Karmieir also wrote his own Concurring Opinion, in which Justice Fitzgerald joined.
EXPRESSION OF JUDICIAL PHILOSOPHY IN MAJORITY OPINION:
ON JUDICIAL RESTRAINT IN DEFERENCE TO THE LEGISLATURE: "Finally, we share the concerns expressed by plaintiffs and their amici about the devastating health effects of smoking and, in particular, the scourge of smoking among young people. We emphasize that because this action is barred by section 10b(1) of the Consumer Fraud Act, it is unnecessary to reach the merits of plaintiffs' claim that PMUSA intentionally deceived the public. Our resolution of the present case is in no way an expression of approval of PMUSA's alleged conduct. Nevertheless, as justices, our role is to apply the law as it exists, not to decide how the law might be improved. We must defer to the policy of the legislature as expressed in the language of the Consumer Fraud Act. Therefore, plaintiffs and others who would seek to alter the conduct of tobacco companies must take their case to the General Assembly, where they might seek amendment of section 10b(1); to the FTC, where they might seek changes in regulations; or to Congress, where they might seek amendments to the Labeling Act."
HOLDING IN JUSTICE KARMEIER AND JUSTICE FITZGERALD'S CONCURRING OPINION
- "[P]laintiffs failed to establish that they sustained actual damages. In reaching this conclusion, I hasten to add, as the majority opinion did, that rejection of plaintiffs' cause of action should in no way be construed as an endorsement of [Philip Morris]]'s conduct. Our reversal of the circuit court's judgment is not an exoneration of [Philip Morris]. It is merely a conclusion that this particular cause of action by this particular group of claimants seeking this particular form of recovery cannot be sustained under the law of Illinois.
On Criminal Justice
- Justice Lloyd Karmeier wrote the majority decision, which, over the vigorous and lengthy dissent of Justice Charles E. Freeman (in which justice Thomas L. Kilbride and Justice McMorrow joined), which concluded amongst other things, that although a judge cannnot defer to a sheriff's department in allowing all criminal defendants to be wired with electronic stun belts, and although stun belts are only warranted where a manifest need is shown, the wiring criminal defendants with electronic stun belts during their trials did not, on its own, violate the defendants due process rights, or rights to a fair trial.
On Employer and Employee Rights / Labor Unions
- Justice Lloyd A. Karmeier concurred in the majority opinion, written by Justice Thomas R. Fitzgerald, concluded, amongst other things, that the defendant, a labor union that falsely picketed the plaintiff corporation with signage indicating that the corporation was paying its workers below the prevailing wage, was entitled to have the jury's punitive damages award against it reduced from $325,000 to $50,000, under the belief that the award represented a 75 to one ration of punitive damages to compensatory damages, and was thus in violation of the labor union's due process rights.
- Justice Rita G. Garman was the lone dissenting vote, noting that "[b]ecause I believe the majority's decision in this case does not adequately vindicate the goals of punitive damage awards, I respectfully dissent. While the majority cites the goals of punishment and deterrence as informing its punitive award against the union, the resulting award of $50,000 does not achieve the purpose of those goals."
On Negligence
- Justice Karmeier concurred in the majority opinion, written by Justice Rita B. Garman, over the vigorous and lenghty dissent of Justice McMorrow, in which Justice Charles E. Freeman joined concluded that, where a driver errantly drover her vehicle over the sidewalk and into a Burger King restaraunt, causing the death of a patron sitting in the restaruant, Burger King owed a legal duty to that patron to protect him. In doing so, the Court abandoned the opposite precedent, which had been established in Illinois in Stutz v. Kamm (1990) (Court refused to impose premises liability where a driver had driven through a wall and into a waiting room because the injury was unforeseeable); and Simmons v. Aldi-Brenner Co. (1987) (storekeeper and owners had no duty to protect customers against injury caused by driving automobile through storefront).
On Property Rights
- Judge Karmeier concurred in the majority opinion, written by Justice Rita B. Garman, in a case where Chicago Alderman Charles Bernardini proposed a zoning change to prohibit the construction of the plaintiff's apartment building after plaintiff had already begun construction of the apartment building, and that zoning change became effective the following month, established two rules: (1) that a property owner has a vested right to continue building, or in the alternative is entitled to compensation, if the property owner made substantial expenditures prior to the indroduction of a later-passed zoning ordinance that would otherwise prohibit such building; and (2) that a property owner's investments in development are at his own peril once an amendment that would prohibit his development has been officially proposed.
On Regulation
- Justice Karmeier concurred in the majority opinion, written by Justice Thomas R. Fitzgerald, which concluded amongst other things, that defendant Intel's representation that its Pentium 4 computer processer was the best and fastest on the market, in contrast to its prior model, the Pentium 3 processer, was not a statement subject to attack as fraudulent, or as a "deceptive business practice" under the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act. In so ruling the Court overturned the decision of the circuit judge where the case originated, in notorious Madison County, Illinois.
- Justice Karmeier concurred in the majority opinion, which held that Based on these other authorities, read in conjunction with Illinois law, we conclude that the FTC could, and did, specifically authorize all United States tobacco companies to utilize the words “low,” “lower,” “reduced” or like qualifying terms, such as “light,” so long as the descriptive terms are accompanied by a clear and conspicuous disclosure of the “tar” and nicotine content. Thus Philip Morris could not be liable for defrauding smokers by using these terms, even if the terms were not accurate. In so ruling the Court overturned a contrasting $10.1 billion jury award out of notorious Madison County, Illinois. Justice Karmieir also wrote his own Concurring Opinion, in which Justice Fitzgerald joined.
EXPRESSION OF JUDICIAL PHILOSOPHY IN MAJORITY OPINION:
ON JUDICIAL RESTRAINT IN DEFERENCE TO THE LEGISLATURE: "Finally, we share the concerns expressed by plaintiffs and their amici about the devastating health effects of smoking and, in particular, the scourge of smoking among young people. We emphasize that because this action is barred by section 10b(1) of the Consumer Fraud Act, it is unnecessary to reach the merits of plaintiffs' claim that PMUSA intentionally deceived the public. Our resolution of the present case is in no way an expression of approval of PMUSA's alleged conduct. Nevertheless, as justices, our role is to apply the law as it exists, not to decide how the law might be improved. We must defer to the policy of the legislature as expressed in the language of the Consumer Fraud Act. Therefore, plaintiffs and others who would seek to alter the conduct of tobacco companies must take their case to the General Assembly, where they might seek amendment of section 10b(1); to the FTC, where they might seek changes in regulations; or to Congress, where they might seek amendments to the Labeling Act."
HOLDING IN JUSTICE KARMEIER AND JUSTICE FITZGERALD'S CONCURRING OPINION
- "[P]laintiffs failed to establish that they sustained actual damages. In reaching this conclusion, I hasten to add, as the majority opinion did, that rejection of plaintiffs' cause of action should in no way be construed as an endorsement of [Philip Morris]]'s conduct. Our reversal of the circuit court's judgment is not an exoneration of [Philip Morris]. It is merely a conclusion that this particular cause of action by this particular group of claimants seeking this particular form of recovery cannot be sustained under the law of Illinois.
External links
References
- ↑ http://www.atra.org/reports/hellholes/
- ↑ http://www.atra.org/reports/hellholes/report.pdf
- ↑ http://madisonrecord.com/news/contentview.asp?c=130374
- ↑ http://www.state.il.us/court/SupremeCourt/Justices/Bio_Karmeier.asp
- ↑ http://cbs2chicago.com/local/Lloyd.Karmeier.State.2.324750.html
- ↑ http://www.goedwardsville.com/site/news.cfm?newsid=16089520&BRD=2291&PAG=461&dept_id=473648&rfi=6
